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PEREIRA V. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SERVICES
733 N.E.2D 112 (2000)
FACTS
Linda M. Pereira worked for the Massachusetts Department of Social
Services (DSS) for over twelve years with an "unblemished record."'
However, Pereira' s employment was terminated by DSS in 1996 as a result of
a racist "joke" that Pereira told at a political dinner. At the time of her
discharge, she was a "protective investigator" for the southeast region of
Massachusetts, where approximately thirteen percent of DSS's clients are
African-American. 2 As a protective investigator, Pereira reviewed, screened,
and investigated allegations of child abuse and neglect. In the course of her
investigations, she had frequent contact with DSS clients, members of the
community, and other social service agencies.3 Her investigations required her
to "gain access to the homes of affected families."'
Pereira also served on the Fall River City Council from 1991 to 1995.5 On
February 5, 1996, Pereira attended and spoke at a dinner for the outgoing City
Council members.6 Although the city clerk sponsored the dinner and many
city officials and community leaders of Fall River attended the political event,
members of the general public .were not invited.7 At the event, Pereira made
a racially insensitive comment, which the parties later characterized as a
"joke."'  Pereira said, "Why do black people have sex on their minds?
Because they have pubic hair on their heads."9
The day after the dinner, the press reported Pereira's statement and there
was extensive publicity about the incident.'" DSS's area director in Fall River
received several complaints from clients and members of the community
expressing their outrage at Pereira's statement." According to testimony, at
least two DSS employees had difficulties conducting investigations as a result
of Pereira's statement.' 2 One client refused to allow a DSS employee into her
house stating that because Pereira was an employee of DSS, "DSS must be
I. Pereira v. Commissioner of Soc. Se'vs., 733 N.E.2d 112, 115 (Mass. 2000).
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racist," and therefore, she could no longer trust DSS to make objective
decisions about her case. 3
Two days after the incident, Pereira was placed on administrative leave
with pay.' 4 DSS conducted an internal investigation, and on April 10, 1996,
the Commissioner of Social Services (commissioner) sent a letter to Pereira
notifying her that her employment with DSS would be terminated
immediately.'5, The commissioner indicated that Pereira was being terminated
because of the "joke" she made at the City Council dinner. 6 The letter also
stated that Pereira's comment was "insulting" and expressed "views which are
contrary to one of the fundamental principles under which the Department of
Social Services operates: that all people who come into contact with the
Department will be treated with respect, dignity and fairness."' 7 In addition,
the letter indicated that Pereira's comment impaired DSS's ability to carry out
its mandate because the comment had undermined public confidence in the
agency and interfered with the abilities of other DSS employees to perform
their jobs.' 8
In September 1996, Pereira brought suit against DSS and the
commissioner, in both the commissioner's official capacity and as an
individual. 9  Pereira alleged that she had been terminated from her
employment with DSS in violation of her First Amendment rights under the
United States Constitution 20 and in violation of her civil rights under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.21 She also alleged several state law and common law claims.22 Pereira
sought declaratory and injunctive relief against DSS and monetary damages
from the commissioner individually.23 After hearing cross motions for
summary judgment, the Superior Court of Suffolk County granted summary
judgment for Pereira on her civil rights claim against the commissioner in her
individual capacity and ordered a trial to ascertain damages.2 The judge also
granted Pereira injunctive relief against DSS and ordered it to reinstate her
nunc pro tunc with back pay.25 He also found that Pereira's common law
13. Id.
14. Id. at 116.




19. Id. at 114.
20. U.S. CoNs'r. amend. I. ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.").
21. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (2000); Pereira, 733 N.E.2d at 114.
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claims raised issues of material fact that had to be resolved at trial and that her
state law claims were untimely filed, and thus barred.26 DSS and the
commissioner appealed the judgment and were granted a stay, pending the
appeal of the order to reinstate Pereira, the trial on damages against the
commissioner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the trial on liability and damages
for Pereira's common law claims.27 The appeals were consolidated in the
Appeals Court and were transferred to the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts on its own motion.' On this appeal, only Pereira's federal
claims under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and 42
U.S.C. § 1983 were at issue.29
HOLDING
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reversed the decision of the
Superior Court granting summary judgment for Pereira.3" The court held that
Pereira's "joke" was not speech on a matter of public concern, and thus was
not protected speech under the First Amendment. 3' In addition, the court
found that the commissioner's decision to terminate Pereira' s employment was
justified and, therefore, did not violate Pereira's civil rights under 42 U.S.C §
1983.32
ANALYSIS
In reversing the decision of the Superior Court, the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts applied a two-prong test, first established in Pickering v.
Board of Education33 and reiterated in Connick v. Myers,34 to determine
whether the "joke" made by Pereira was speech protected by the First
Amendment and whether DSS violated her civil rights by terminating her
employment. 35  Under the first prong of the two-part test, the court must
determine whether the public employee's speech is about a matter of public
26. Id. at 114, 115.
27. Id. at 115.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 114 n.2.
30. Id. at 114.
31. Id. at 119.
32. Id. at 122.
33. Pickering v. Board. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (establishing two-part test for determining
whether employee's free speech rights have been violated).
34. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (applying and reiterating Pickering analysis in free
speech employment context).
35. Pereira, 733 N.E.2dat 116.
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concern.36 Under the second prong, the court must examine and balance the
competing interests of the public employee and the government employer.1
7
Although the speech in both Pickering and Connick could be characterized as
work-related, neither case stipulated that the two-part test only applied to a
public employee's work-related speech.3" In both cases, the court noted that
its role was to examine the employee's speech and balance the interests of the
employee and the government.39
In applying the first part of the Pickering analysis, the court looked at "the
content, form, and context of [Pereira's] given statement" to ascertain whether
the speech related to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the
community.' The court noted that the primary goal of the First.Amendment
is to protect "the public marketplace [of] ideas and opinions."41 The court
discussed several Supreme Court cases and found that Pereira's "joke" had
"little in common" with speech the Supreme Court had determined to be of
"public concern."42 Matters of public concern pertain to issues that are central
to the idea of self-government and are vital in educating and informing the
public through "free and open debate. 43
The court noted that Pereira's "off-the-cuff remark" was not central to any
political or social concern within the community, and that Pereira herself
admitted that she did not mean to disseminate any message by telling her
"joke."" Thus, the court concluded that Pereira's "joke" was not protected
speech because it was not on a matter of public concern.4" Pereira argued that
the "public concern" prong of the Pickering test should not apply because her
speech was unrelated to her employment and was expressed outside the work
environment. 46 Therefore, she argued that her speech should be afforded the
same level of protection as speech expressed by a member of the general
public.47 However, the court distinguished the cases Pereira relied on and
36. 733 NE2dat 117.
37. Id.
38. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568-70, 573-75; Connick, 461 U.S. at 143, 145, 147.
39. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568; Connick, 461 U.S. at 142.
40. Pereira, 733 N.E.2d at 117 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. at 147-48).
41. Id. at 118 (quoting Eberhardt v. O'Malley, 17 F.3d 1023, 1026 (7th Cir. 1994)).
42. Id. (citing Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 595 (1972); Mt. Healthy City Sch Bd. v. Doyle,
429 U.S. 274, 284 (1977); Givham v. Western Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410,414 (1979)).
43. Id. at 118, 119 (quoting Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 571-572 (1968)). See also
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964) (stating that matters of public concern deal with "essence
of self-government").
44. Pereira, 733 N.E.2d at 119. See also Tindle v. Caudell, 56 F.3d 966, 970 (8th Cir. 1995)
(holding that amusing guests at a private party without intent to disseminate message is not considered
speech on matter of public concern).
45. 733 N.E.2d at 119.
46. Id. at 119 n.17.
47. Id. at 119 n.17. See also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 157 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(stating that when public employees speak away from workplace and speak about matters unrelated to their
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emphasized that none of the cases she cited disavowed the "public concern"
prong of the Pickering test.
48
After concluding that Pereira's speech was not on a matter of public
concern, the court nevertheless proceeded to examine Pereira's claim under the
second prong of the Pickering test.49 The court noted that precedent was not
settled on the issue of whether a court should analyze speech under the
balancing prong when it has already determined that the speech at issue is not
on a matter of public concern. The court was persuaded by the argument that
it should consider the balancing prong of the Pickering analysis even when a
public employee's speech did not pass prong one because the balancing prong
provides an added safeguard to ensure that restraints on an employee's First
Amendment rights are justified. 5' The court noted that although a public
employer may have a right to restrict a public employee's speech in many
situations,52 a public employee's speech is still entitled to some constitutional
protection.53  A public employee cannot be discharged from public
employment "on a basis that infringes that employee's constitutionally
protected interest in freedom of speech."54  The court cited Rankin v.
McPherson5 in support of the view that courts should proceed to the balancing
test even when the employee's speech occurred outside the work
environment. 56
The second prong of the Pickering test balances the interests of the
employee in expressing herself freely with the interests of the government
employer in maintaining the integrity and effectiveness of its services.5 Any
harm to the employee's interest in free expression that could result from the
employee's speech must not be used to outweigh the employee's interest in
work, their First Amendment rights are equal to those of general public).
48. Pereira, 733 N.E.2d at 119, 120 (relying on Eberhardt v. O'Malley, 17 F.3d 1023 (7th Cir. 1994)
(holding that novel written by state employee, which might contain confidential information, was protected
speech); Flanagan v. Munger, 890 F.2d 1557 (10th Cir. 1989) (finding public concern prong impossible to
apply to employee's nonverbal expression, but balancing prong was applicable); Berger v. Battaglia, 779
F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159 (1986) (holding that Pickering test was applicable even
to speech unrelated to workplace).
49. 733N.E.2dat19, 120.
50. Id. (citing United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454,465,480 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983)).
51. Id. at 120.
52. Id. at 117.
53. Id. at 117 n.14.
54. Id. at 117 (quoting Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 383 (1987)).
55. Rankin, 483 U.S. 378 (applying Pickering two-part analysis to speech expressed outside
workplace).
56. Pereira, 733 N.E.2d at 120 n.18 (citing United States v. National Treasury Employees Union,
513 U.S. 454, 466 n.10 (1995)). See also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983) (holding that "our
(the court's] responsibility is to ensure that citizens are not deprived of fundamental rights by virtue of
working for the government").
57. 733 N.E.2d at 120.
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free expression.5" Even if the court finds that the employee's interest
outweighs the government's interest, the employee must still show that the
protected speech was a "motivating factor" in her termination.59 In this case,
DSS admitted that Pereira was terminated as a direct result of her speech.6°
The court viewed Pereira's interest in telling her "joke" as "relatively
insubstantial" because her motive was not to contribute to an ongoing public
discourse or to take a position on an issue.6' The only motive asserted by
Pereira was that she was responding to a "grossly sexist and vulgar joke" from
another guest.62 After assessing Pereira's relatively insubstantial interest, the
court examined DSS's interest in preventing offensive speech by its
investigators. 63 The court noted that although the government must justify its
intrusion on an employee's interests, a wider degree of deference to the
government employer's decision is permitted where "close working
relationships" with the community are necessary for the government to
accomplish its goals.64 The court explained that even though DSS might not
have been able to justify Pereira's termination on the grounds that it was an
immediate workplace disruption, the "joke" had a clearly negative impact on
DSS and interfered with DSS's ability to perform its duties.65
The court noted that Pereira's comment undermined public confidence in
DSS as a fair and respectful agency. 66 It concluded that this negative public
view of DSS interfered with DSS's ability to carry out its mission.67 The court
emphasized that DSS investigators must be perceived as fair and unbiased in
order to perform their duties, which involve intrusive investigations into
people's personal lives. 6' The court deferred to the commissioner's judgment
that an investigator must behave in a way that instills confidence in her ability
"to treat families of diverse racial and ethnic backgrounds with respect,
dignity, and fairness.
69
The court cited several cases in support of the factors it used in evaluating
the government's interests.70 These factors include whether the speech impairs
58. Id. at 117 (citing Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 668 n.15 (1994)).
59. Id. at 117 n.15 (citing O'Connor v. Steeves, 994 F.2d 905, 913 (1st Cir. 1993)).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 121.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 122 (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 151-52 (1983)).
65. Id. at 121 (citing United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454,483 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
66. Id. at 121-22.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 122.
70. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 151, 152 (1983); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378,390
(1987); United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 494 (1995) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
212 [Vol.7:207
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the ability of the department to perform its functions, the character of those
functions, and the degree of deference given to employment decisions made
by government officials."
The court asserted that Pereira had a responsibility to DSS to exhibit better
judgment and should have known that her comment could undermine public
confidence in the agency. Thus, the court found that DSS had a legitimate
and substantial interest in maintaining public confidence in its ability to
perform its mandated duties." The court concluded that DSS's interest in
being perceived as an unbiased agency outweighed Pereira's relatively
insubstantial interest in making a racially insensitive comment, which was not
on a matter of public concern and which had foreseeable negative effects on
DSS's reputation and effectiveness.74
The court did not address the second issue on appeal, which was whether
the commissioner was entitled to a qualified immunity defense. The court
had already concluded that Pereira's rights were not violated, and therefore,
the defense was unnecessary because Pereira had no claim under 42 U.S.C. §
1983.6
CONCLUSION
A public employee who makes an offensive comment in a situation that
directly and negatively impacts an agency's ability to perform its mandate is
not always entitled to First Amendment protection if the speech does not meet
the two-prong Pickering test. The court stated that under the First
Amendment, protection against adverse personnel decisions extends only to
speech on matters of public concern.77 The government employer has wide
discretion in restricting an employee's speech if it undermines the agency's
reputation as an unbiased and fair organization. Such a rule places much
discretion in the hands of a public employer. However, the burden is on the
government to show that its interest in regulating the speech and terminating
employment is greater than the employee's interest in expressing herself.
This is an important case for situations in which the employee's speech is
not work related, but may be censored because of its demonstrable impact on
dissenting); Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 673 (1994); Tindle v. Caudell, 56 F.3d 966, 972 (8th Cir.
1995).
71. Pereira, 733 N.E.2d at 121, 122.
72. 733 NE2d at 121, 122.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 122.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 119.
20011
Wash. & Lee Race & Ethnic Anc. L.J.
the government agency. A government employee's speech is not as protected
as it might be if the employee were simply a member of the general working
public. According to the holding in this case, a government employer can
restrict speech which is not related to the workplace simply because the
employee works for the government. Government employees seem to have a
greater duty to guard what they say than members of the general public do. A
fine line exists between protecting the government's interest in maintaining its
integrity and unduly restricting public employee's speech. In this case, the
insubstantial interest and foreseeable consequences of Pereira's actions were
outweighed by the stronger interests the government had in performing its
duties.
Because this appeal dealt with a federal question, it sets precedent for both
Massachusetts and other jurisdictions that deal with a similar question. The
court uses precedent from many different jurisdictions in its opinion, which
illustrates how each case deciding a First Amendment issue can affect the
larger body of First Amendment jurisprudence.
The opinion also supports the proposition that courts should look at both
prongs of the Pickering test in their entirety even when the first prong is not
satisfied. The second prong acts as a safeguard to an employee's free speech
rights to ensure that the employer's curtailment of speech is justified even
when the speech is not on a matter of public concern.
This decision also demonstrates the wide degree of deference that courts
offer to government judgment. In addition, the case reiterates the importance
for an appellate court to make an independent examination of the record in
First Amendment issues because of the importance of free speech rights in the
United States. The nation was built on a concept that citizens should be free
to express themselves even if they hold unpopular viewpoints. This
fundamental right of free speech is one that must be protected and guarded
against unreasonable abridgement. Thus, courts must always make careful and
thorough examinations of the record when First Amendment rights are at issue.
It is unclear what effect this case may have on free expression. On one
hand, the reasoning in this case could provide incentives for government
employees to behave with the utmost control and judgment in not saying
offensive and "racist" comments. On the other hand, this case might have a
"chilling" effect on speech and thereby mitigate the importance of the safety
valve/outlet role of free speech.
This case is illustrative of the struggle going on within our country
between the freedom to express offensive, hurtful speech and the desire to
promote and encourage civil, respectful speech. Because justifications for
curtailing free speech are narrow and tied to very specific situations, the court
[Vol.7:207
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must look at each case's individual facts to ascertain whose interests are more
substantial. In this case, the court has chosen to favor the community's
interest in respecting diversity and maintaining public confidence in the
government over an individual's right to express distasteful comments that
lend little to the public discourse and have foreseeably negative consequences.
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